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A COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP CONCERNING THE
ADMISSION OF MIGRANTS

James A.R. Nafziger*

Scholarship on immigration law has often overlooked an international legal framework. Consequently, immigration decisions sometimes
ignore constraints of international custom. In concrete human terms,
the end result is to make it difficult for a prospective migrant to convince immigration authorities that, under normal circumstances, international law protects a freedom of movement which may entitle the
petitioner to documented entry.
The following essay will focus attention on American legal scholarship concerning the admission of migrants. 1 This topic is instructive
and practical because of its impact on both municipal and global law.
An eminent international jurist observed that greater foresight by
scholars twenty-five years ago could have averted many current problems of migration. 2 Today, these problems arise from such sources as
the population explosion, periodic droughts, the pull factor of opportunities in advanced economies, and massive political unrest in the Horn
of Africa, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
elsewhere. 3 Migrants are knocking at the gates of sovereignty, even
crashing some of them down. Until recently, every fifth person in
• Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. B.A., 1962, University of Wisconsin;
J.D., 1967, Harvard University; M.A., 1969, University of Wisconsin.
l. This Article will not focus on issues concerning the welfare of migrants either during or
after their international movement. Thus, the issue of labor exploitation through illicit and
clandestine trafficking, though it involves the movement and entry of laborers, lies beyond the
scope of these comments. See Warzazi, Exploitation of Labour through Illicit and Clandestine
Trafficking, United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights (Report of the Special Rapporteur), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.640 (1975). Also, this Article will not specifically examine such related
issues as emigration or voluntary return. See Ingles, Study of Discrimination in respect of the
Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to His Own Country, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights (Report of the Special Rapporteur), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.
l (1963).
2. Ferguson, Introduction, Refugees: A New Dimension in International Human Rights, 10
PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 58 (1976).
3. See generally Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the Response
of the International Community, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 3, 12-21 (1982); Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT.
L. REv. 433, 436 (1983).
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Somalia and every tenth person in Djibouti was a refugee. 4 Even under
less extreme circumstances, migration provokes sensitive issues in the
domestic politics of recipient countries. s International legal scholars
need more than ever to respond creatively and systematically to the
serious problems that result from the basic human need of migration.
Unfortunately, American legal scholarship concerning the admission
of migrants has two questionable tendencies. First, sorp.e writers assume
that the state has a sovereign right to deny entry to any or all aliens.
Second, there is a tendency to limit the status of "refugees" to victims
of specific forms of governmental persecution. This Article explains
these tendencies and suggests alternatives. Part I examines the international legal framework within which American legal scholarship can
be of some help. Part II explores the tendencies of American legal
scholars to assume that states may deny admission to all aliens and
to view narrowly the definition of refugees. Part III posits a tentative
explanation for these tendencies. Part IV concludes that international
legal scholars can and should have a more significant role in shaping
immigration policy.
I.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A.

The General Admission of Aliens

The general admission of all aliens - victims of natural disasters,
persecution, serious breakdowns of public order and armed conflict;
economic refugees; and persons simply in search of a better life is subject to international law. Even those writers who have acknowledged broad sovereign competence to exclude aliens have also
insisted upon a rightful exercise of that power, "tempered by the facts
of modern civilization" and principles of international law and comity. 6
For example, racial, geographical, and other forms of discrimination
have long been regarded even by exclusionists as "tokens of arrogance."'
A state has no "right" to exclude aliens unless, individually or collectively, they pose a serious threat to the safety, security, welfare,
or essential institutions of the state. 8 The exclusionary proposition that
4. Nanda, World Refugee Assistance: The Role of International Law and Institutions, 9
HOFSTRA L. REv. 449, 450 (1981) (citing reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees).
5. Vincent, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 36 AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK, Dec. 1982, at I, 3.
6. W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (8th ed. 1924).
7. I C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 218 (2d rev. ed. 1951).
8. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 762 (1981) ("Any government [may exclude aliens]
when entry would be likely to endanger the public health, welfare and safety or threaten national
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a state has a right to exclude all aliens is questionable for several reasons.
Writings used to support the proposition require legitimate reasons for
exclusion in individual cases, such as necessity or self-preservation of
a state. Also, states have customarily admitted aliens and have at times
considered themselves bound to justify exclusion on grounds of public
safety, security, welfare, or threat to essential institutions. 9
Although some courts may have characterized the practice of admitting aliens as a voluntary waiver of the right to exclude or a selfimposed limit on the exercise of the right, it is reasonable to regard
state practice and the accompanying justification as recognition of a
qualified duty to admit some aliens in normal circumstances. Moreover,
commonly cited judicial opinions and related authority, at least in
English language sources, are unconvincing; they often misinterpret
other authority, contradict contemporaneous statements of opinio juris,
and rest on questionable, often racist, presumptions. The international
significance of migration and the interdependence of states lend support to the argument that the general admission of aliens should not
be regarded as an untrammeled discretionary power within the exclusive
domestic jurisdiction of states.
Thus, although a state certainly has no duty to admit all aliens who
might seek to enter its territory, it has a qualified duty to admit aliens
when they pose no threat to the public safety, security, public welfare,
or essential institutions of a recipient state. Admittedly, this formulation is so broad as to permit expansive discretion by states, but affirming it encourages states, in their mutual interest, to develop more precise
and humane rules, principles, and procedures to govern the general
admission of aliens.
security."); cf. id. at 723 (ambiguous criterion of undesirability in exclusionary statement). See
. also J. BLUNTSCHLI, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE 228-29 (Se ed. revue et augmentee 1895)
("L'exclusion de certains etrangers doit etre motivee par l'ordre, a surete ou le bien publics
sinon elle serait en contradiction, avec le principe de la liberte des relations internationales. ");
L. CAVARE, I LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PosITIF 275 n.88 (2d ed. 1961) ("[The state freedom
to regulate the admission of aliens is a power] dont l'exercise peut etre critique par Jes organes
internationaux.") (citing G. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS 80 (2d ed. 1932-1934)); E.
BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 37 (1915) ("At the present day
the right of admission and sojourn on the part of the unobjectionable aliens is almost universally
recognized. Qualifications of the right, which are to be found in the possibilities of exclusion,
expulsion and the fixing of conditions of sojourn by the state, must in practice be based upon
reasonable grounds."); see also Hucker, Migration and Resettlement Under International Law,
in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 327 (R. MacDonald, D. Johnston
& G. Morris eds. 1978); D. O'CONNEL, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 695 (1970) ("Considering the
universal restrictions placed on immigration in this century, and the almost total exclusion of
aliens by some countries, it is surprising to discover that there is a widespread consensus of
opinion, particularly on the Continent, favouring a general duty in international law to receive
aliens.").
9. For a more detailed development of these points, see Nafziger, The General Admission
of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983). In addition to the qualified
duty of states to admit some aliens, positive international law explicitly protects several rights

Journal of Law Reform

168

[VOL. 17:2

The moral duty of states to admit aliens under certain circumstances
is even more specific. Short of massive programs for resettling
unemployed workers and refugees, "it remains the duty of each country to open its own borders as widely as possible, without looking for
excuses or waiting for others to act." 10 Specifically, "there is a moral
duty of host states not simply to get rid of the foreign work force
when a recession hits, nor to apply retroactive measures in order to
thin its ranks." 11
Within this legal and ethical framework, states are entitled to a wide
margin of discretion in admitting aliens, but they should not close the
door completely on grounds of sovereignty or a unilateral determination that immigration decisions lie wholly within domestic jurisdiction.
Thus, a country such as Nigeria, in the throes of an economic crisis,
may be entitled to expel large numbers of undocumented Ghanaian
workers. A country such as Malaysia may be entitled to maintain its
delicate balance between ethnic-racial groups through the use of relatively strict immigration controls, in order to preserve its social order.
A country such as Mexico, with massive unemployment and
underemployment, need not bear the same burden of international
responsibility to admit aliens from Guatemala as the United States.
Countries such as Pakistan or Somalia, with populations already swollen
by large numbers of refugees from neighboring countries, cannot be
expected to accept still greater numbers. Ironically, in recent years several
developing countries least able to absorb immigrants have borne the
greatest alien burdens. 12

B.

The Admission of Refugees

Refugees are persons who seek and urgently need foreign refuge,
for whatever reason. One class of refugees is defined by treaty law.
Under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, a "refugee" is any person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
of migration. These include the right to leave and to return to one's country of origin or nationality,
the right to family unity which entitles members of a family to rejoin another member
already admitted into a foreign state, the right to be free from exclusion on racial grounds,
and other entitlements under bilateral and multilateral conventions. G. GooDWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 196-97 (1978).
IO. S. HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 224-25 (1981).
11. Id. at 225.
12. Carlin, supra note 3, at 12-21; Fallows, Immigration: How it;s affecting us, 252 An.
MONTHLY, Nov. 1983, at 45, 48.
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avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 13
This definition is clearly inadequate as a comprehensive definition
of refugees. The 1951 Convention was designed to respond to the postWorld War II crisis of displaced persons in Europe and not to arrest
the development of a customary, more comprehensive regime of refugee
law. Unfortunately, the Convention ignores economic refugees, victims of war, victims of natural disasters, and persons fearing persecution after a breakdown of public order in just one part of a single
country. These latter categories of refugees would seem to be within
the scope of the average person's definition of a refugee. By excluding
them, however, the treaty definition has led governments to ignore the
plight of many migrants or prospective migrants whom the layperson
might expect to be treated as refugees. Moreover, a narrow definition
of "refugee" makes it difficult to apply the legal consequences of that
classification to specific cases where, for example, it is necessary to
know something about socio-economic circumstances in order to
evaluate a refugee's claim of governmental persecution. Finally, the
1951 Convention does not address the issue of whether a state may reject prospective refugees who apply for that status at the frontier, that
is, upon entry into the country of refuge. That gap in the Convention
is understandable because, in post-World War II Europe, most applicants for refugee status were already in foreign territory, after having been displaced by the war and its aftermath.
A more functional definition of "refugee," based on urgent human
need, would include all migrants in critical need of refuge in a foreign
state, regardless of their specific motivation for seeking refuge. Fortunately, municipal and regional norms may, and occasionally do, expand the definition of a "refugee." Recently, for example, a federal
court acknowledged the importance of economic and other factors in
reviewing an administrative determination on the admissibility of de
facto refugees already present in this country. In Haitian Refugee Center
v. Smith, 14 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a petitioner
13. ·convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. Parties to a 1967 Protocol have agreed to apply
the Convention without limitation to "events occurring before I January 1951." Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as Protocol). Some writers have questioned whether
there is any universally accepted definition of "refugee" under international law. A. GRAHLMADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1966); Weis, The Concept of
Refugee in International Law, U.N. Doc. HCR/INF. 49, at 32 (1960).
14. 676 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1982).
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for asylum under the treaty definition should be allowed, as a matter
of due process, to produce evidence of living conditions in the country
of departure. These conditions might include ''the power structure,
prisons, legal systems, politics, society, and economics." 1 '

C.

Academic Neglect

American scholarship concerning most topics of international law
generally keeps ahead of official decisions. Leading writers have influenced municipal decision makers to adopt a broader vision of the
national interest and have informed the process of codifying and progressively developing international law.
It is puzzling, therefore, that American legal scholarship has lagged
behind in the process of developing and implementing the international
law of migrant movement and entry. Few American scholars have addressed fundamental problems of immigration in more general studies
of international law. The "invisible college" of international lawyers 16
has usually been just that - invisible - in the policy-planning process. Too often, apocalyptic or panicky assumptions of economists and
demographers have gone unchallenged.
A good example of the invisibility of international lawyers in planning
immigration law and policy is the highly publicized work of the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The Select Commission was established in 1978 "to study and evaluate ... existing laws,
policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and
refugees to the United States and to make such administrative and
legislative recommendations to the President and the Congress as are
appropriate." 11 According to the Final Report of the Commission, 18
although prominent immigration and labor specialists were involved,
international legal scholars were not. Not one recognizable academic
specialist in international law appears in the list of some fifty staff
members, not one is listed among the fifty research grantees, and not
one among hundreds of participants in formal 'consultations' initiated
by the Commission. It should be no surprise, then, that the Final Report
of the Commission overlooks international law in its discussion
and recommendations pertaining to immigration policy and law.
International lawyers are invisible not only in high-level policy planning, but also in the sessions of their own "invisible college." For
example, not a single teacher-scholar of international law appeared
as a speaker on either of two recent panels concerning undocumented
15. Id. at 1042.
16. Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 217 (1977).
17. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 907, 908 (1978).
18. JT. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Comm. Print 1981).
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aliens at annual meetings of the American Society of International
Law. 19 Given the dearth of international legal scholarship on the subject of immigration, it is not surprising that Congress, not academia,
has initiated discussions about such options as the use of international
financial institutions to extend grants and loans to developing st~tes
experiencing serious burdens of mass migrations, as part of the
developmental programs of those states. 20
II.

A.

Two TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN SCHOLARSIDP

An Assumption that a State May Deny Admission to Any
and All Aliens: The Result of Undocumented Scholarship

Although state practice, regional obligations, and universal norms
disclose a practice of states to admit at least some aliens, it is still
useful to examine the tendency of American legal scholars to assume
that a state has a right to deny admission to any and all aliens. This
tendency has been instrumental in shaping exclusionary provisions of
municipal law and policy, in influencing interpretations of state duties
toward refugees, and in delaying the emergence of human migration
as a comprehensive topic on the international legal agenda. 21 Migrant
labor would benefit from a multilateral convention to govern the admission of aliens by states. Short of that, it is essential for the world
community, in accordance with emerging international law, to insist
that states be accountable for denials of entry to aliens on the basis
of an objective threat to the safety, security, welfare, or essential institutions of a state. The invisible college of international legal scholars
ought to be more active in formulating and further developing such
standards.
Instead, one too often finds references, often without authority, to
the notion that a state may legitimately exclude any or all aliens. 22
A significant example involves the writings of a thoughtful specialist
in human rights, Richard Lillich. Professor Lillich defends the proposition that states possess an absolute right, in the absence of a treaty,
to exclude aliens. In reviewing a book on immigration law, 23 Lillich
19.
20.
21.

73 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 119 (1979); 76 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. _

(1982).

See Nanda, supra note 4, at 472.

For a rather polemical example of this effect, see Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 u. PITT. L. REV. 447, 447-48, 450-51, 458 (1983).
22. See, e.g., C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (4th ed. 1965); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 372-73 (2d ed. 1966); W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 176 (1979); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO Puauc INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (4th. ed. 1981); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power
to Exclude Aliens, 82 CoLUM. L. REv, 957, 968-69 (1982).
23. Lillich, Book Review, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 670, 670-72 (1982) (reviewing G. GooDwINGILL, supra note 9).
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devotes a substantial portion of his comments to this theme - by no
means unique among scholars - even though the book under review
says that states claim only a "very wide margin of discretion" 24 in
controlling the entry of aliens.
A preponderant view, though not a rule, is that matters of alien
entry belong within the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. Thus,
the book reviewed by Professor Lillich realistically and correctly notes
that because states seek freedom to control entry, it is "not easy to
bring matters of entry and exclusion within the bounds of international
law." 25 This is not to say, however, that it has not been done. In his
commentary on the exclusionary statement, Lillich intriguingly inserts
his own word, "customary," in brackets to qualify the general term
"international law. " 26 He thereby questions the customary hospitality
of states to some alien entry and suggests that it is jurisprudentially,
rather than technically, difficult to bring international law to bear on
issues of alien entry. Actually, the book under review generally
demonstrates that international law governs the entry and exclusion
of aliens, though it may be technically difficult to articulate
comprehensively.
·
Authority for Professor Lillich's position is questionable. In his Hague
Lectures, Professor Lillich put it very simply: "Under customary international law, of c,ourse, a State is under no duty to admit aliens
into its territory." 27 As authority, he refers only to a book published
in 1915 by Professor Edwin Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad. 28 Although Borchard recognizes that there may be an ultimate
power of exclusion, upon which a right is based to exclude undesirable
aliens, he is careful to summarize opposing arguments and to attribute
the exclusionist position to "[c]ourts in the United States and Great
Britain. " 29 He also writes that an "ultimate power" to exclude aliens
"would violate the spirit of international law." Thus, although the
"grounds of exclusion are fixed by the public interests of each stafe,"
they are limited to "dangerous or undesirable" aliens. Moreover, an
"arbitrary or unjust exclusion" gives rise to a political, though not
a legal pecuniary claim. 30 Although he refers to the recognized inherent
power of a state to exclude foreigners, Borchard nevertheless concludes
that "the right of admission and sojourn on the part of unobjectionable
aliens is almost universally recognized. Qualifications of the right, which
24. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 94.
25. Id.
26. Lillich, supra note 23, at 671.
27. Lillich, Duties of States regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, III
1978, at 329, 339 (1980) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
28. E. BORCHARD, supra note 8.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 46-48.

RECUEIL DES

CouRS

WINTER

1984]

Scholarship Concerning Migrants

173

are to be found in the possibilities of exclusion, expulsion and the fixing of conditions of sojourn by the state, must in practice be based
upon reasonable grounds. " 31
The tendency to assume that states may deny entry to all aliens seems
to be premised on a form of positivism which relies'" very heavily on
treaties for the progressive development of migration law. 32 Such a
bias, which often fails to respond to human needs and realities, is unnecessary. Even the highly positivistic dictum in The Case of the S.S.
"Lotus,, established only that "[r]estrictions upon the independence
of states cannot ... be presumed," 33 not that they must take the form
of positive pronouncements. Instead, it is important to take fuller account of the principles and evidence of custom that impose a duty
upon states to share the burden of admitting aliens and thereby to
contribute significantly to global solidarity.
A Canadian specialist has observed that although states may exclude
persons whose presence is inimical to the national interest, it is
misleading and unproductive to suggest that states are free to do as
they please; that is, to assume exclusive national competence to govern
the admission of aliens. 34 American scholarship should take fuller account of the governing principles of international law, the spirit of
existing state behavior and decisions, the expectations they elicit, and
the extension of their coverage, by analogical reasoning, to issues of
immigration.

· B.

The View that Treaties Define the International Law of
Refugees: The Result of Overdocumented Scholarship

The law of refugees presents other examples of the conservatism of
United States legal scholarship in addressing issues of migrant movement and entry. When, however, one moves from the general admission of aliens to the admission of specifically protected groups of aliens,
particularly refugees, one moves from undocumented to overdocumented
scholarship.
Although the international law of refugees is moving steadily beyond
the confines of the definition of a refugee found in Article 1 of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, 35 American legal scholarship is often wedded to that
definition. 36 It is as if the law of refugees were a kind of gloss on
31. Id. at 37.
32. Lillich, supra note 23, at 671.
33. The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 18 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
34. Hucker, supra note 8, at 327, 329.
35. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee
Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rsv. 9, 11 (1981); Le & Esser, The Vietnamese Refugee and
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that definition. As a consequence, American jurists have had surprisingly little to say about broader and more functional definitions of
a refugee. These include the definitions of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees 37 and such regional instruments as the Convention on Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa of the Organization of African Unity. 38 By contrast to the conservatism of American scholarship, a recently published collection of
essays 39 evidences a greater inclination of European scholars to define
the term "refugee" broadly. 40 Similarly, the 1982 Session on R~fugee
U.S. Law, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 656, 666 (1981); Note, The Right of Asylum Under United
States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 539 (1981); Note, Those Who Stand at the Door:
Assessing Immigration Claims Based on Fear of Persecution, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 395, 396
n.3 (1983); Comment, Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution Arising from a Prior
Asylum Case, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 719, 721 (1981). But see Young, Between Sovereigns: A
Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 339, 348 (1982). Most recent writings by United States scholars have
centered on federal laws, with little attempt to consider definitions of "refugee" broader than
that in the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), which reiterates the
definition in Article I of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, see supra note 13 and accompanying text. The Le & Esser article, however, contains an interesting discussion of the capacity
of United states law, under the Refugee Act of 1980, to take account of economic as well as
political circumstances in interpreting the "persecution" requirement.
37. Article 6 of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees generally
reiterates the definition of a refugee found in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, see supra
note 13 and accompanying text. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A 1775 (1950).
Even so, the High Commissioner, in practice and by special delegation, assumes much broader
jurisdiction over displaced persons within their country of nationality or origin, persons generally
in need of the good offices of the High Commissioner, victims of natural disasters, and other
persons who, for whatever reason, cannot avail themselves of the protection of their government. In broad language, the United Nations General Assembly delegated the High Commissioner in 1979 "to continue to promote . . . solutions to problems of refugees and displaced
persons wherever they occur." G.A. Res. 34/60, para. 2, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
173, U.N. Doc. 34/724 (1979).
38. Article I of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa defines the term "refugee" to include not only persons covered by the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, but also any person com-·
pelled to leave his home country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination,
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin
or nationality." OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
art. I, 1 2, done Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47 [hereinafter cited as OAU Convention];
see also Hyndman, Asylum and Non-Refoulement-Are These Obligations Owed to Refugees
Under International Law?:
The definition of "refugee" in the OAU Convention is wider than that in the 1951
Convention. It is a pragmatic one related to the problems of the African continent.
From the late 1950's onwards there have been, largely as a result of the presence or
after effects of colonial regimes, troubles and wars resulting in massive displacements
of peoples not always fitting easily into the 1951 Convention definition, even as extended by the 1967 Protocol, and the definition of the OAU Convention was drafted
with these factors in mind.
57 PHILIPPINE L.J. 43, 55 (1982).
39. 3 MICH. Y.8. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES (1982).
40. See, e.g., Grahl-Madsen, Refugees and Refugee Law in a World in Transition, 3 M1cH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 65 (1982); Melander,
Nordic Refugee Law and Policy, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'LLEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROB-
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Law at the Institute of Public International Law and International Relations in Greece reflected an inclination of European and British Commonwealth scholars to define "refugee" under both the 1951 Convention 1967 Protocol and customary practices of states and organizations.••
Such practices include the admission of de facto refugees, 42 Class B
refugees, 43 refugees in orbit, 44 victims of natural disasters, and other
categories of refugees outside the scope of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention 1967 Protocol. 45
The emerging concept of temporary refuge has become a particularly
prominent international concept. In an era of political and economic
turbulence, temporary refuge has become a significant alternative to
all-or-nothing responses to petitions for refuge. Mass migration has
discouraged neighboring recipient states from granting permanent refuge,
but has encouraged them to grant or consider granting temporary refuge
until a permanent refuge in another country can be found. Moreover,
one characteristic of contemporary mass migration is that, breaking
with tradition, contemporary refugees often expect to return to their
country of origin. Therefore, many refugees today consider their status
only temporary and are therefore unwilling to integrate themselves effectively into the society and culture of recipient states.
International law also recognizes the benefit of cooperation in easing short-term misallocations that may accompany large-scale migrations. A study of the status of refugee law would be incomplete without
considering the impact of this cooperation. The concept of temporary
refuge has its roots in Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, which proLEMS OF REFUGEES 229 (1982); Nobel, Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa, 3 MICH. Y.B.
lNT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 255 (1982).
41. Papers and proceedings of the Session may be found in XII THESAURUS AcROASIUM (1983).
42. De facto refugees are refugees receiving status without qualifying as 1951 Convention/1%7
Protocol refugees. The following are the most common categories of de facto refugees:
(i) persons who have passed through the eligibility procedure in their country of residence
and whose applications have been rejected or eliminated but who are unable or ... unwilling to return to their country of origin (political dissidents); (ii) stateless persons
not recognized as refugees who are unable or . . . unwilling to return to the country
of their habitual residence; (iii) political offenders who are not extradited to their country
of origin; (iv) persons who fulfil the other conditions of the definition of refugees
in the 1951 convention as amended by the protocol but who still avail themselves of
their national passports; ... (v) 'exiles' and/or 'crypto-refugees'[;] ... (vi) (p]ersons
whose passpons have expired and who have been told that their passports will be extended or renewed only on the condition that they return to their country of origin
but who are unwilling to do so[;] ... (vii) draft evaders ... draft resisters ... and
deserters . . . .
Hucker, supra note 8, at 335-36 (citing P. WEIS, 2 REPORT ON PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES AND ExILES IN EUROPE (Legal Report) 5 (1974)).
43. Class B refugees a!e persons who, not being political refugees, are outside their country
of origin because of political reasons or who upon return will face political sanctions.
44. Refugees in orbit are persons who are shuttled from one country of refuge to another,
with a consequent status approaching statelessness.
45. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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vides that "[t]he Contracting States shall allow [unlawfully residing]
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain
admission into another country .... " 46 Article 32 provides that contracting states may not expel a refugee in their territories except for
reasons of national security or public order. Article 32 also provides
that "[t]he Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable
period within which to seek legal admission into another country. " 47
Article 3(3) of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides that
"[s)hould a State decide in any case that exception to the principle
of [non-refoulement] would be justified, it shall consider the possibility
of granting to the person concerned, under such conditions as it may
deem appropriate, an opportunity, whether by way of provisional asylum
or otherwise, of going to another State. " 48 In the concise words of
an Australian writer:
[A]lthough states are still resisting binding obligations to grant
asylum in the sense of granting a right of permanent settlement, state practice ... does indicate an acceptance of
humanitarian obligations - an acceptance that refugees who
arrive at foreign borders seeking admission should not be rejected, whether such rejection would mean a return across the
border to the country fled, or the sending of the refugees upon
a further dangerous journey to seek admission at another frontier, and that they should be given temporary refuge at least,
provided that this is placed within a wider context of international cooperation. As well, the necessity for this assumption
of responsibility at an international level seems to be gaining
increasing acceptance. 49
Principles of international cooperation, solidarity, and burden sharing have their roots in the preamble to the 1951 Convention, which
reads as follows: "Considering that the grant of asylum may place
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of [the] problem . . . cannot be achieved without international
cooperation .... " 50 In order to give effect to these observations, Article 2(2) of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides that
"[w]here a State finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant
46. Convention, supra note 13, at art. 31.
47. Id. at art. 32.
48. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16 at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967).
49. Hyndman, supra note 38, at 77; see also Conclusions on International Protection Adopted
by the Executive Committee, in Report of the 28th Session of the Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add.l, at 12-16 (1977).
50. Convention, supra note 13, at preamble.
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asylum, States individually or jointly or through the United Nations
shall consider, in a spirit of international solidarity, appropriate measures
to lighten the burden on that State."' 1 The December 1981 Report _of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "[c]alls upon the
international community to share the burden of assisting refugees and
displaced persons the world over, taking into account the economic
and demographic absorptive capacity of the countries concerned . . . . '' 52
On the regional level, a treaty among members of the Organization
of African Unity entitled the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa requires that all contracting states
cooperate "in the spirit of African solidarity" 53 with any others experiencing a burden as a recipient state. The steady development of
these principles testifies to the willingness of the international community to extend the definition of a refugee beyond Article 1 of the
1951 Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol. Even though states
may have been reluctant to accept obligations of temporary refuge and
international cooperation explicitly as opinio Juris, the general practice "does indicate that these concepts are being accepted in fact." 54
In sum, the progressive development of refugee law seems to transcend the narrow scope of current treaty law. A new body of customary
law and general principles on the admission of refugees is emerging
from several sources. These sources include norm-creating provisions
of the treaty definition of a refugee as far as it goes, United Nations
General Assembly Resolutions, norms to which the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees adheres, the recommendations of international conferences, state practice, emergent concepts such as that of
temporary refuge, and such general principles as those of international
cooperation, solidarity, and burden sharing." These developments merit
greater attention by American legal scholars.
Ill.

A

TENTATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE

Two

TENDENCIES

A tentative explanation for these two significant tendencies of
American legal scholarship may be a jurisprudential bias in favor of
common law precedent and black letter pronouncements. For example, the notion that a state has a right to exclude any and all aliens
rests "almost exclusively"' 6 on interpretations and misinterpretations
of antiquated common law precedents. These precedents are principally
51. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967).
52. 36 U.N. GAOR Annex 725 (agenda item 83) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/36/725 (1981).
53. OAU Convention, supra note 38, art. 11(4). Sub-paragraph five defines the status of
a temporary refugee.
54. Hyndman, supra note 38, at 73, 77.
55. Id. at 67.
56. M. KONVJTZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 18 n.53 (1946).
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The Chinese Exclusion Case" and Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, 58
both of which have racist underpinnings and are nearly a century old.
Little attention is paid to general principles of interdependence, cooperation, and good faith, nor to the state practice of hospitality, historically
and geographically, toward aliens seeking entry.
The effect of positivism on American scholarship has been summarized as follows:
Everyone likes categories, and legal philosophers like them very
much. So we spend a good deal of time, not all of it profitably,
labeling ourselves and the theories of law we defend. One label,
however, is particularly dreaded: no one wants to be called a
natural lawyer. Natural law insists that what the law is depends
in some way on what the law should be. This seems metaphysical
or at least vaguely religious. In any case it seems plainly wrong.
If some theory of law is shown to be a natural law theory,
therefore, people can be excused if they do not attend to it
much further. 59
Even worse, perhaps, than admitting a weakness for natural law is
questioning positivistic assumptions about the conclusiveness of treaties
in defining international law. Nevertheless, the penchant of positivists
to regard the reality of natural rights as nothing more than spooky,
pious-sounding abstraction is misplaced. It is simply incorrect to argue
"that human rights are rights legally only because they have been granted
by positive law" and misleading to assert that natural law "is not law." 60
As Marcus Aurelius, John Locke, Eleanor Roosevelt, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. would surely remind us, human rights
are derived from principles of natural law. 61 Positive law, on the other
hand, serves the vital function of articulating and formalizing consensus on legal duties based upon these natural rights. 62 Thus, natural
law and positive law have a symbiotic relationship. They are mutually
necessary in establishing human rights; it is difficult to have one without
the other.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
[1891) A.C. 272.
Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 319 (1949).
M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 1-17 (1973); Castberg, Natural law and human
rights; An idea-historical survey, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-24 (A.
Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968); Tanaka, Some Observations on Peace, Law, and Human Rights,
in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 242, 250 (W. Friedmann, L. Henkin & 0.
Lissitzyn eds. 1972).
62. M. MANELI, JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1981).
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AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

A tentative explanation for the conservatism of American scholarship on migration law may therefore be its positivistic preoccupation
with explicitly formulated and formalized prescriptions. Instead, legal
scholars ought to broaden, not simply adapt themselves to, rigid
analytical frameworks such as that of the 1951 Refugee Convention
and 1967 Protocol. In addressing issues associated with the natural process
of human migration, scholars should examine all relevant values, norms,
and practices in the light of natural rights theory, most especially the
basic human need of migration. The presumptions need to be reversed.
A leading British scholar has observed that
[t]here are some grounds for thinking of the right to freedom
of movement as the first and most fundamental of man's liberties .... One of the things that is meant by saying that men
have a natural right to freedom of movement is to assert that
the desire to move is a natural, universal, and reasonable one;
and hence that it is not so much a man's desire to move that
needs to be justified as any attempt to frustrate the satisfaction of that desire. 63
A failure to take account of the dynamics of human aspirations to
migrate or a preoccupation with positive pronouncements is irresponsible. One is reminded of President Millard Fillmore's chillingly stoic
comment about the abolition of slavery: "God knows that I detest
Slavery, but it is an existing evil, for which we are not responsible,
and we must endure it, and give it such protection as is guaranteed
by the Constitution, till we can get rid of it without destroying the
last hope of free government in the world. " 64 Today, a xenophobic
climate inhibits the path of justice for migrants. We are reminded that
in a world in which the principle of nationality is the foundation of domestic and of international legitimacy, large numbers
of refugees tend to dilute the national community which they
join, and to be resented as alien intruders. But they deserve
a chance to become part of this community. What is ethically
imperative is an international, or failing that, a national
guarantee not just of assistance but of settlement and integration in other countries. 65
63.
64.
65.

supra note 61, at 31 (emphasis added).
I MILLARD FILLMORE PAPERS 335 (F. Severance ed. 1970).
S. HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 225.
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International legal scholarship has the difficult task of helping to
reconcile certain ideals of human aspiration with popular and sovereign
concerns that a state's reputation for hospitality to aliens may encourage
an unmanageable influx of them. 66 International institutions, including
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and
the International Law Commission, offer an appropriate initial
framework for systematically clarifying and articulating the details of
international immigration law. 67 Comparative legal analysis also helps
disclose emergent custom.
A recent decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court offers a cogent
comparative perspective. In Chandra v. Minister of Immigration, 68 an
alien from Fiji applied for review of an administrative order denying
him permanent residence in New Zealand and ordering him to leave
within fourteen days. The applicant for review sought (I) a review of
the decision of the Minister of Immigration refusing to grant the application for permanent residence in New Zealand; (2) an order directing the Minister to grant the applicant permanent residence in New
Zealand; and (3) such other orders as might appear just. 69 The Minister
of Immigration filed a motion for an order striking out the application for review. In dismissing the Minister's motion, the New Zealand
Supreme Court observed as follows:
Even if the law is that there is now no valid distinction between the duty to act fairly and the duty to .act in accordance
with the rules of natural justice, then there is a duty on the
Minister to act in accordance with the rules of natural justice
as that expression has been extended and as it is understood
by recent decisions to which reference has been made in this
judgment. 10
In applying this formula, the Supreme Court specifically rejected ''the
somewhat xenophobic view"' of Lord Denning in Schmidt v. Secretary
of State for Home Affairs: "l have always held the view that at common law no alien has any right to enter this country except by leave
of the Crown: and the Crown can refuse leave without giving any

66. See Martin, Large-Scale Migrations of Asylum Seekers, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 598,609 (1982).
Martin's article also provides an excellent commentary on recent developments in refugee law.
67. See, e.g., the guidelines on refugee admissions in OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
CoMMIS.SIONER FOR REfuGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRrTinuA FOR DETERMINING REfuGEE

(1979).
68. (1978) 2 N.Z.L.R. 559.
69. Id. at 560-61.
70. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
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reason. " 11 Abandoning the "xenophobic" view of Lord Denning, the
Court recognized ''that the old concept of the Royal prerogative to
keep foreigners at bay has been superseded by the qiodern transportation and the mass population movements of the twentieth century." 12
CONCLUSION

The global community needs a comprehensive international law of
migration. So far, the contributions of American legal scholars to the
development of a new legal regime have been modest. If international
lawyers are to perform a more prominent role, they will need to be
both visionary and realistic. They must help make the law explicit;
hard law, including international agreements, is indispensable. Nevertheless, the hard law can only develop in response to the natural exigencies of migration. These exigencies contradict two fundamental
tendencies of American legal scholarship: to assume that a state may
deny entry to all aliens and to view the definition of a refugee largely
within the narrow framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It is time for scholars and
decision makers to overcome these tendencies and to develop and codify
international agreements which are uninhibited by them.

11.
72.

Id. at 568.
Id.

